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THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT* 
FOR those who love precision and definiteness the question of the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to social and 
economic problems remains an irritating enigma. The judicial con-
struction of due process of law and the equal protection of the law 
has from the first discouraged systematic analysis and defied syn-
thesis. More than one writer has emerged from the study of the 
problem with a neat and compact set of fundamental principles, only 
to have the Supreme Court discourteously ignore them in its next 
case. But paradoxical as it may seem, those who long for a wise 
and fonvard-looking solution of modern social and economic prob-
lems may well rejoice that the application of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to those problems has, for the most part, been halting, change-
able, chaotic, and conflicting. The process of trial and error by 
which a social and economic interpretation of that amendment is 
still being evolved has had certain very wholesome results. It has 
prevented the petrifaction in our law of the earlier individualistic 
doctrines of due process and equal protection of the law. At the 
same time it has left the way open for the courts to correct by the 
increased wisdom of the future the possible mistakes of the present, 
and to adjust the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment to social 
and economic problems which are of necessity shifting and com-
plex.1 The present paper aims to discuss one phase of this trial 
and error process. 
*This paper was read before a joint session of the American Political 
Science Association, the American Economic Association, and the American 
Sociological Society during the annual meetings of these societies at Pitts-
burgh, December, 1921. 
1 "Extreme indefiniteness, however, appears in the light of a wise avoid-
ance of irrevocable conclusions, if we apply to this phase of constitutional 
law as a whole the test of political performance. The greatest defects of 
the decisions from a legal standpoint constitute their saving grace. No con-
stitutional right is asserted without placing in convenient juxtaposition a 
saving on behalf of the public welfare. No rule has been formulated in 
.such a manner as to embarrass an honorable retreat, and if an inconvenient 
precedent is encountered there is little hesitation in overruling it. * * *" 
F~ND, STANDARDS OF AM:etuCAN L"£GISI.A'l.'ION, 2u. See also Freund, Con-
stitutional Limitations and Labor Legislation, 4 !LI.. L. REv. 623. 
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For the purpose of the pre~ent discussion the problem of the 
social and economic interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
·may be stated somewhat as follows: In passing social and economic 
legislation the legislature very commonly subjects the individual to 
some form of compulsion or restraint in order to promote the com-
munity welfare.2 The power to do this, which we call the police 
po~er, together with the powers of taxation and eminent domain, 
are limited by the clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment which for-
bid the tah.1ng of "life, liberty or property without due process of 
law" or the denial of "the equal protection of the law." While 
neither of these clauses can be defined in a clean-cut manner, it 
may be said that the due process clause forbids social legislation 
which is arbitrary; that is, legislation which restricts individual 
liberty or property rights more severely than the advantages to the 
community can possibly justify.3 The equal protection of the law, 
on the other hand, means protection against arbitrary discrimina-
tion or. class legislation.4 ·The whole problem of the application of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to social legislation is bound up in the 
practical construction which the courts give to the term "arbitrary." 
Now, whether or not a workman's compensation act or a minimum 
wage law is "arbitrary" is quite largely a question of opinion. Oo 
this question of opinion the legislature in enacting the law has the 
first word, while the 'courts in deciding whether the law is consti-
t1,ltional have the last word.5 And one of the delicate questions 
which the courts have had to face is this: in deciding whether a 
piece of social legislation violates due process of law or the equal 
protection of the law, how much weight ought a court to give to 
2 Freund characterizes the police power as follows: "It aims directly 
to secure and promote the public welfare, and it does so by restraint and 
compulsion." POLIO> PowER, § 3. 
3 Typical statements of this well-settled rule may be found. in the fol-
lowing cases: Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561 (1906); 
Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223 (1904); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 
197 U. S. II (1905); Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446 (1915). See 12 CORPUS 
Jurus, 931, and cases cited. 
4 Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150 (1897); Connolly v. 
Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540 (1902); Lindsley v. Natural Carboni«;: 
Gas Co., 220 U. S. 6I (19u); also HALL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 143. 
5 For a clear statement of this rule see Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 
666 (1887). 
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the formally pronounced opinion of the legislature that the act in 
question is not arbitrary but is amply justified by existing social 
needs? The judicial attitude toward this question has undergone 
some very interesting changes during the fifty years which have 
elapsed since the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. The writer 
·believes that it has passed through three distinct phases, and is on 
the verge of entering upon a fourth. It is the purpose of this paper 
to trace these changes and to indicate the significance of each. 
I. PERIOD oF JUDICIAL NoN-IN'l'ERFErutNCE-EAru,v VIEW THAT 
· FouR'l'EEN'l'E AMENDMENT no:es NO'!' LIMIT STA'l'Es IN 
EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER 
The first position which the courts assumed in construing the 
Fourteenth Amendment had the great advantage of being simple 
and definite, and it does not therefore require extended comment. 
So far as it relates to our present problem, it may be summarized 
thus : whatever new guaranties were created by the amendment were 
created for the benefit of the newly freed black man and were inap-
plicable to exercises of legislative power which did not involve 
racial oppression or discrimination.6 This doctrine was ·clearly 
announced by Mr. Justice Miller in the Slaughter H oitse cases,7 in 
which he expressed his belief that the amendment would never be 
applied except to cases involving the rights of freedmen. It was 
even more strikingly expressed in the Granger cases, of which Mim11 
v. Illinois is the most important, in which the court declared that 
the due process dause afforded no protection against an unreason-
able regulation by the legislature of public utility rates. "For pro-
tection against abuses by the legislatures,'' runs the opinion of Chief 
Justice Waite, "the people must resort to the polls, not to the 
6 The early history and construction ctf the Fourteenth Amendment is 
discussed in a scholarly article by Professor Corwin, The Supreme Court 
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH. L. REv. 643. The writer has drawn 
heavily upon this article. 
7 "We doubt very much whether any action of a state not directed by 
way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their 
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision [equal 
protection of the law clause]. It is so clearly a provision for that race and 
that emergency that a strong case would be necessary for its application to 
any other." 16 Wall. 36, 81 (1876). 
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courts."8 And while this was dictmn so far as the Munn case was 
concerned, it seems to represent the views of a majority of the court 
for upwards of a decade. We also find ·Mr. Justice Miller, who 
had \vritten the opinion of the majority in the Slaughter House 
cases, complaining in a still lateri decision of the existence of "some 
strange misconception" as to the scope of the due process clause 
which causes it to be regarded "as a means of bringing to the test 
of the decision of this court the abstract opinions of every unsuc-
cessful litigant in a state court of the justice of the decision against 
him, and of the merits of the legislation on which such a decision 
may be founded." 9 And even more significant is the fact that in 
the case of Loan, Association v. Topeka1-0 the court held that a state 
tax levied for a private purpose was unconstitutional, not because 
it violated the guarantee of due process of law, but because it con-
travened those limitations upon legislative power "which grow out 
of the nature of all free governments," and which the court called 
"reservations of individual rights, without which the social com-
pact <:ould not exist. "11 In other words, the court invalidated the 
statute without pointing to any constitutional clause with which it 
was in conflict, apparently without even considering the possibility 
of finding in the due process clause of the newly adopted Fourteenth 
Amendment a positive and specific prohibition against such legis-
lation.12 
8 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. u3, 134 (1876). Compare Mr. Justice Har-
lan's statement in Powell v. Pennsylvania, 1Zj U. S. 678, 686, decided in 
1887: "If all that can be said of this legislation is that it is unwise, or 
unnecessarily oppressive to those manufacturing or selling wholesome oleo-
margarine, as an article of food, their appeal must be to the legislature, or 
to the ballot-box, not to the judiciary." 
9 Davidson v. New Orleans, g6 U. S. C.Jl, 104 (1878). 
10 20 Wall. 655 (1875). . 
11 Some writers have assumed that this case rested upon the basis of 
the due process clause. A careful reading of the case will show that this 
is not correct. Professor Corwin explains this on the ground that since 
the Supreme Court took jurisdiction in the case upon the ground of diver-
sity of citizenship it was not necessary for it to consider the federal ques-
tion of a possible violation of due process of law. See Corwin, op. cit., 7 
M1cH. L. REv. 654 
12 It is interesting that the courts in later decisions have generally pre-
ferred to rest the prohibition against taxation for a private- purpose upon 
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It may be said, then, that the Supreme Court began its interpre-
tation of the Fourteenth Amendment by announcing and applying 
the doctrine of judicial non-interference with social and economic 
legislation. The amendment was held to give the court no authority 
to examine or revise the determinations of the legislature that social 
and economic conditions justify statutory interference with indi-
vidual liberty. That determination was conclusive.13 
II. Tm;; PERIOD oF JumcIAI, RUTHLESSNESS-MECHANICAL AND 
l,EGALISTEC INTERPRETATION OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
In adopting the doctrine of judicial non-interference just described, 
the Supreme Court thoughtfully safeguarded its future peace of 
mind by refusing to give any authoritative definition of due process 
of law or equal protection of1the law. The meaning of these clauses, 
said the court, would have to be evolved 'by the process of judicial 
inclusion and exclusion.14 The way was thus discreetly left open 
for a change in the judicial construction of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and it was only a matter of a few years before that change 
had taken place; and by the middle eighties we find the courts stand-
ing openly and triumphantly for the doctrine that the Fourteenth 
the authority of Loan Association v. Topeka, supra, and the doctrine of 
"fundamental principles" therein set forth, rather than to place it squarely 
upon the ground of due process. See the careful study by McBain, Taxation 
for a Private Purpose, 29 Por.. Scr. QuAR'.l'. 185. That the rule now rests 
upon the due process clause, however, seems to be clear from the language 
of the Supreme Court in Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. 
S. n2 (1897); Jones v. Portland, 245 U. '8. 217 (1917); Green v. Frazier, 
253 u. s. 233 (1920). 
13 It may be noted that the first American case involving the validity of 
a legislative restriction on women's hours of labor was decided in 1876, 
Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 Mass. 383. The law was sustained. 
Nothing was said about the Fourteenth Amendment, and it seems clear that 
it did not occur to anyone that its restrictions had any bearing on the problem. 
14 "But apart from the imminent risk of a failure to give any definition 
which would be at once perspicuous, comprehensive, and satisfactory, there 
is wisdom, we think, in the ascertaining of the intent and application of 
such an important phrase in the. Federal Constitution, by the gradual process 
of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall 
require, with the reasoning on which such decisions may be founded." 
Davidson v. New Orleans, g6 U. S. 97, 104 (1878). 
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Amendment imposes judically enforceable restrictions upon social 
Iegisla;tion.15 
It was probably inevitable that the judicial attitude toward the 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment should change. It is 
certainly not difficult to explain why it did so. In the first place, 
the Supreme Court itself undenvent a thoroughgoing change in per-
sonnel. Five new justices took their seats between 1875 and 1885.16 
When Mr. Justice Miller died in l8go he left behind him on the 
bench but one colleague who had sat with him in the Slaughter 
House cases, and that colleague, Mr. Justice Field, had from the 
outset been an outspoken and dogmatic apostle of the new faith.17 
This fact need not be over-emphasized, b~t it is not entirely with-
out significance that a majority of the court was by then made up 
of justices whose service on the Supreme Court had begun after 
the close of the Civil War. This perhaps suggests a second reason 
for the change in judicial attitude under discussion; the fact that 
with the gradual adjustment of the problems of reconstruction, both 
political and constitutional, the immediate post bellum conditions 
which had stimulated the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
became less vivid in men's minds and ceased to present so strong 
an argument against a broad and general application of the clauses 
of that amendment.18 There is to be ta]_{en into account, in the third 
place, a more or less continuous pressure brought to bear upon the 
court by the bar and by interests desiring protection against unwel-
come legislative interference, to adopt a broader interpretation of 
due process of law. Mr. Justice Miller's lecture to the legal pro-
15 This development is clearly traced by Professor Corwin, op. cit., 7 
MICH. L. R.Ev. 643. See BEARD, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN HISTORY, Ch. III, 
entitled "The Revolution in Politics and Law." 
16 These were Justices Harlan, Woods, Matthews, Gray, and Blatchford. 
17 See the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Field in the Slaughter House 
cases, supra, in which he urged that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed 
to citizens of the United States the fundamental rights belonging to the 
citizens of all free governments. 
18 Professor Corwin suggests that the fear which the court had origi-
nally felt that under the Fourteenth Amendment congressional legislation 
would be substituted for state legislation after the fashion of the Civil Rights 
Act had by this time been eliminated by the decisions invalidating the last 
of those acts, op. cit., 7 MICH. L. REv. 656. 
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fession on this point in the _case above referred to19 seems to have 
had no effect. Counsel seeking relief for their clients continued to 
urge that the due process clause ought reasonably to be construed 
so as to afford protection against arbitrary and unreasonable exer-
cises of legislative power. They were also able to bring evidence 
to the attention of the court that its original view of the intentions 
of the framers of the amendment was not historically sound and 
that the guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment had really been 
designed for the protection of private rights of liberty and prop-
erty generally and not exclusively for the ·protection of the negro.20 
And finally, as the movement for the regulation of public utility 
rates continued, and as the newer movement for protective social 
and labor legislation set in, a court which in 1875 was willing in 
the Loan Association case to nullify a state law on no stated con-
stitutional grounds, but on an alleged violation of natural rights, 
could hardly be expected to stand pat on the rather indiscreet dictum 
in the Munn case that for "protection of abuses of legislative power 
the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts." 
19 Supra, p. 739. 
20 In 1882, in arguing the case of San Mateo County v. Southern Pac. 
R. Co., n6 U. S. 138 (1885), before the Supreme Court, Mr. Roscoe Conk-
ling, who had been a member of the Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction 
which had drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, produced in court the unpub-
lished journal of the committee to support his contention that the amend-
ment had not been originally intended for the exclusive protection of the 
negro race. See TAYLOR, Du:e PRoc:Ess oF LAW, 32. This journal has been 
published with critical comments. KsNDRICK, TH:e JouRNAI. oF 'l'HJ> JoIN'l' 
COM.llHTTl>t oF F1FT:ei>N ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39th Congress, 1865-1867, Colum-
bia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law. Vol. 62. For 
an analysis of the intentions of Congress in passing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment see Fr.ACK, THE ADOPTION oF 'l'H:e FoURTJ>l>N'l'H AM:eNDM:eN'l'; passim,, also 
Corwin, op. cit., 7 MICH. L. R:ev. 643. In 1900 Mr. Justice Peckham, speak-
ing for the court in Ma.xwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 591, referred to the 
narrow construction which had been given to the Fourteenth Amendment 
in the Slaughter House cases and said that the "suggestion that only dis-
crimination by a state against the negroes as a class or on account of their 
race was covered by the amendment as to the equal protection of the laws 
has not been affirmed by the later cases. * * * That the primary reason for 
that amendment was to secure the full enjoyment of liberty to the colored 
race is not denied, yet it is not restricted to that purpose, and it applies to 
everyone, white or black, that comes within its provisions." 
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Even a casual examination of this new judicial attitude will indi-
cate how thoroughgoing a revolution it wrought in our constitu-
tional law. This new doctrine involved two things. First, it 
imposed upon the courts a new duty, the duty of applying to social 
l~gislation the limitations of due process of law and equal protection 
of the law. Secondly, this duty made it necessary for the courts 
to determine just how the guaranties of due process and equal pro-
tection of the law could be used as yardsticks for measuring the 
validity of social legislation. It is interesting and instructive to 
see how the courts approached this problem. 
It must be borne in mind that at this time it was the recognized 
theory of the judicial function that -courts do not make law, they 
merely find or discover law.21 Mr. Morris R. Cohen has called this 
the "phonograph" theory of judicial construction, in which the 
judge is merely a vocal medium through which the preexistillg legal 
principles are given expression.22 These principles are absolute and 
immutable and the judge has no responsibility for them except to 
see that they are applied in pertinent cases. But in applying the 
Fourteenth Amendment to social legislation the task was not so 
simple as the theory. There were no prii.iciples of law to be dis-
covered. The guaranties -of due process and equal protection of 
the law had never been applied as restrictions upon the general 
2 1 This theory is critically treated in GRAY, Tm; NATURE AND SOURCES 
OF THE LAW, Ch. IV. See also Carter, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law, 
24 AMER. L. R.Ev. 752, as well as his "LAW, ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND FUNC-
TION." Dean Pound has given us the following graphic statement of the 
theory: "A German writer has put the received theory thus: The court is 
an automaton, a sorll of judicial slot machine. The necessary machinery has 
been provided in advance by legislation or by received legal principles; and 
one has but to put in .the facts above and draw out the decision below. 
True, he says, the facts do not always fit the machinery, and hence we 
may have to thump and joggle the machinery a bit in order to get anything 
out. But even in extreme cases of this departure from the purely automatic, 
the decision is attributed, not at all to the thumping and joggling process, 
but solely to the machine." Courts and Legislation, 7 AMER. PoL. Sci. REv. 
361, 364. 
2 2 The Process of Judicial Legislation, 48 AMER. L. R.Ev. 161, 164 Com-
pare with this early rigid conception of law Mr. Justice Holmes' interesting 
suggestion that "the prophecies of what the courts will do in. fact, and noth-
ing more pretentious, are what I mean by law." COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, 173. 
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legislative power of the states. Equal protection of the law was 
a brand new guarantee so far as the federal Constitution was con-
cerned ;23 and due process of law had been limited in its previous 
construction to matters of law enforcement, procedure, and racial 
oppression.24 Now what does a court do when it has to "find" law 
where there is none? Naturally, but without undue publicity, it 
draws upon its own ideas as to what the absolute, eternal, and 
immutable principles of law ought to be with reference to the case 
in question. And this is exactly what the ~ourts did in applying 
the Fourteenth Amendment to social and economic legislation dur-
ing this period of judical self-assertion. They read into the phrases 
"due process of law" and "equal protection of the law" the meaning 
derived from their own training and intellectual background. They 
translated the clauses in question into the terms of the economic 
doctrine and the political and juridical philosophy which had served 
the vastly simpler speculative needs of the pioneer society of the 
forties and fifties. We may pause for a moment to consider what 
this meant concretely.2" 
In the first place, it meant the application of a laissez faire doc-
23 The federal Bill of Rights contains no guarantee of the equal pro-
tection of the law. Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, how-
ever, there has been a tendency upon the part of the courts to regard the 
du(\ process clause and the equal protection of the law clause as overlapping 
to a large extent. As one authority puts it, "the broad interpretation which 
the prohibition as to 'due process of law' has received is sufficient to cover 
very many of the acts which, if committed by the states, might be attacked 
as denying equal protection." Wn.I.OUGHBY ON CoNSTITUTION, II, 874. See 
also Chief Justice Taft's discussion of this point in the recent case of Truax 
v. Corrigan, Adv. Opin., Oct. Term, 1921, 132, 138. 
24 Corwin, op. cit., 7 MICH. L. ~v. 643. For a careful study of the 
narrow application given to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment 
see Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil vVar, 
24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 46o. 
2s PouND, THE SPIRIT oF THE Co:r.ruoN LAW, Chapters IV and VI. See 
Mr. Justice Holmes' celebrated dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 
45, 75 (1905) : "This case is decided upon an economic theory which a 
large part of the country does not entertain. * * * The Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics * * * a consti-
tution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of 
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez 
faire." 
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trine to the problem of the nature and extent of the legislative regu-
lation of businesses affected with a public interest, and the problem 
of what the public purposes are for which property may be taken 
by eminent domain. There is no space for detail, but merely for 
an illustration or two. The doctrine of Munn v. Illinois, already 
stated 26 was by gradual steps modified and finally discarde<;l, 27 and 
in its place we have the declaration by the Supreme Court that a 
legislative regulation of public utility rates amounts to a deprivation 
of property without due process of law if it does not allow a return 
on the capital investment of at least six per cent.28 .We find the 
public uses for which alone, under due process of law, private prop-
erty might be taken by eminent domain limited in meaning in the 
main to be synonymous with "use by the public," a doctrine which 
placed legislative discretion almost at the vanishing point.29 
In the second place, in applying the F;ourteenth Amendment to 
the legislative exercises of the police power, the courts again evolved 
principles of law which embody a pronounced individualism. The 
quintessence of this individualism is to be found in the well-known 
doctrine of "liberty of contract," in terms of which the due process 
clause began to be construed in the state courts in the later eighties. 30 
This doctrine of liberty of contract had great plausibility. It 
asserted in substance that when two parties came together to reach 
an agreement that was not contrary to public policy the legislature 
26 Supra, p. 739· 
21 This interesting development is traced by Corwin, The Supreme Court 
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH. L. RlW. 643. See also BEARD, CoN-
~MPORARY AMilRICAN HISTORY, 67-87. 
28 Willcox v. Consolidated Gas ~o., 2I2 U. S. 19 (I909). 
20 The rule that private property may be taken by eminent domain only 
for a public purpose was not definitely subsumed under the guarantee of 
due process of laW' until the decision in Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 
I66 U. S. 226 (IS¢). For the early development of the rule see McBain, 
Taxation for a Private Purpose, 29 Por.. ScI. QUAR'.L\ I85, I87, and note. 
For discussionJ of the "use by the public" rule in the law of eminent domain 
see LEWIS, E:MINEN'l' DOMAIN, Ch. VII. 
30 The doctrine seems first to have been announced in Godcharles v. 
W:igeman, II3 Pa. St. 43I (I886), and Millett v. People, II7 Ill. 294 (I886). 
For elaborate discussion of the doctrine see Pound, Liberty of Contract, I8 
YALE L. JouR 454; also FoSTER, LIBERTY oF CONTRACT AND LABOR LAws. 
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had no right to interfere and to dictate the terms of that agreement 
or the conditions under which it should be made or <:arried out. 
The concept of individual liberty which provided the philosophical 
basis of this doctrine had formed the essence of radicalism a cen-
tury before; and the jurists of this period, having gulped down Sir 
Henry Maine's dogma that "the movement of the progressive socie-
ties has hitherto been a movement from status to contract,''31 
regarded themselves as the apostles of a liberal faith.32 It was only 
by the relentless application of the doctrine of liberty of contract 
that the fruits of progress could be saved from the onslaughts of 
reaction. Wholesome as that doctrine undoubtedly was and is in 
certain aspects and applied in certain situations, the juristic appli-
cation of it during this period produced some very startling results. 
Applied concretely, it came to mean that the legislature had no more 
power to control the contract of employment between the Pennsyl-
vania Railroad and one of its switchmen than to control the contract 
of sale between two farmers haggling over the price of a cow. It 
meant that the state could not disturb the sacred right of an adult 
woman to work "at any time of the day that suits her"33 or as many 
hours during the day and night as she might wish.S.J. In short, this 
liberty of contract doctrine raised an almost insuperable barrier 
a1 MAINE, THE ANCIENT LAW [Pollock's Ed.], 165. For criticism of 
this application of Maine's theory see POUND, THE SPIRIT oF THE CoMMON 
LAw, 28. 
32 A most interesting expression of this point of view occurs in the 
Preface to the Second Edition of GRAY"s R.i>sTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION 
oF PROPER'rY (1895), in which, in protesting against the doctrine of spend-
thrift trusts, the author writes: "Now things are changed. There is a 
strong and increasing feeling, which has already led to many practical results, 
that a main object of the law is not to secure liberty of contract, but to 
restrain it, in the interest, or supposed interest, of the weaker, or supposed 
weaker, against the stronger, or supposed stronger, portion of the com-
munity. Hence, for instance, laws enacted or contemplated for eight hours' 
labor, for weekly payments of wages by corporations, for 'compulsory arbi-
tration,' etc., that is, laws intended to take away from certain classes of the 
community, for their supposed good, their liberty of action and their power 
of contract; in other words, attempts to ,bring society back to aii organiza-
tio1i founded 01i status and not upon contract." (Writer's italics.) 
33 People v. Williams, 189 N. Y. 131 (1907). 
34 Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98 (1895). 
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against what seem now the mildest forms of protective labor legis-
lation.35 
The guarantee of the equal protection of the law, on the other 
hand, received an equally individualistic interpretation, borrowed 
from the common law. That interpretation did not deny the validity 
of all class legislation enacted in the e.,'{ercise of the police power, 
but it recognized the propriety of only one classification, that based 
upon the common law distinction between persons who are sui juris 
and those who are not.36 This meant, in substance, -that social or 
economic legislation must treat alike all persons except infants, 
lunatics, wards, or those under some other definite legal disability. 
Here, of course, is the key to the refusal of the courts during this 
period to allow the legislatures to accord special protection to women 
in industry.37 Here is also to be found the underlying philosophy 
of the following typicai judicial utterance invalidating a legislative 
regulation of the time and method of wage payment in certain indus-
tries :88 "The workingman of intelligence is treated as an imbecile. 
Being over 2r years of age, and not a lunatic or insane, he is deprived 
of the right to make a contrac~ as to the time when his wages shall 
become due. Being of sound mind, and knowing the value of a 
horse, he is not allowed to make an agreement with the corporation 
that he will work sixty days and take the horse in payment." By 
this rigid and legalistic construction of the requirements of equal , 
protection of the law the courts invalidated long lists of police regu-
lations designed to improve the conditions prevailing in particular 
industries or to benefit particular classes. 
Now in applying these doctrines, what respect did the courts 
accord to the opinion of the legislature, embodied in statutes, that 
prevailing social and economic conditions justified and demanded 
one of the forms of social legislation above mentioned? That 
respect was certainly scant.39 The attitude assumed by the courts 
35 Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YAL~ L. JouR. 454. For elaborate cita-
tion of cases see FOSTER, LmtRTY oF CoNTRAC'l' AND LABOR LAWS, passim. 
36 Corwin, op. cit., 7 MICH. L. Rev. 664 Seager, The Attitude of Amer-
ican Courts Toward Restrictive Labor Laws, 19 POL. Scr. QUART. 589. 
37 Ritchie v. People, and People v. Williams, siipra. 
as Johnson v. Goodyear Mining Co., 127 Cal. 4, II (1899). 
B9 Sir Frederick Pollock criticises the decision of the Supreme Court 
in the Lochner case, sitpra, upon this ground: "The legal weakness of this 
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toward such legislation was usually one of suspicion, not infrequently 
one of open hostility,40 and almost invariably one which placed upon 
the shoulders of those defending the legislation the burden of proving 
it to be constitutional.41 The time-honored doctrine that laws are 
presumed to be valid until proved beyond all reasonable doubt to be 
otherwise seemed to be forgotten or ignored.42 The courts admitted 
reasoning, if we may say so, is that no credit seems to be given to the state 
legislature for knowing its own business, and it is treated like an inferior 
court which has to give affirmative proof of its competence." The New York 
Labour Law and the Fourteenth Amendment, 2I LAW, QuAR'l.' REv. 2II. 
40 "When it is sought, under the guise of a labor law, arbitrarily, as 
here, to prevent an adult female citizen from working at any time of the 
day that suits her, I think it is time to call a halt. * * * The tendency of 
legislatures, in the form of regulatory measures, to interfere with the law-
ful pursuits of citizens, is becoming a marked one in this country, and it 
behooves the courts firmly and fearlessly to interpose the barriers of their 
judgments when invoked to protect against legislative acts plainly trans-
cending the powers conferred by the Constitution upon the legislative body." 
People v. Williams, I8g N. Y. 131, 135 (I907). 
41 "There is no reasonable ground-at least none which has been made 
manifest to us in arguments of counsel-for fixing upon eight hours in 
one day as the limit within which woman can work without injury to her 
physique, and beyond which, if she work, injury will necessarily -follow." 
Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, II4 (I8g5). "When a health law is challenged 
as unconstitutional on the ground that it arbitrarily interferes with personal 
liberty and private property without due process of law, the courts must be 
able to see that it has, at least in, fact, some relation to public health, and 
that the public health is the end actually aimed at, and that it is appropriate 
and adapted to that end. * * * It cannot be perceived how the cigarmaker is 
to be improved in his health or morals by forcing him from his home and its 
hallowed associations and beneficent influences, to ply his trade elsewhere." 
In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. g8, II5 (I885). "To the common understanding tqe 
trade of a baker has never been regarded as an unhealthy one." Lochner 
v. New York, supra, at p. 59. 
42 For the nature and development of the doctrine of reasonable doubt 
see the writer's paper, Constitutional Decisions by a Bare Majority of the 
Court, 19 MICH. L. REv. 77I. It is, of course, obvious that if the courts 
recognize the propriety of legislative classifications based only upon the dis-
tinction between those who are sui jttris and those who are not, they have 
automatically created a presumption which shifts the burden of proof onto 
those who defend any other basis of classification. See Corwin, op. cit., 7 
MICH. L. Rsv. 666. 
"Where any doubt as to the constitutionality of such statutes could find 
lodgment, courts all too frequently declared the acts void." Brandeis, The 
Living Law, IO Iu .. L. REv. 46!, 464. 
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that there were cases in which liberty of contract or other private 
rights might be restricted by police legislation without violating the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but they demanded that a positive justi-
fication for each new restriction should be clearly made out. And 
withal, they assumed in many cases an attitude very like that of the 
belligerent Irishman who announced to his friend, "I am open to 
conviction, but show me the man who· can convince me." 
That the burden of proof irt respect to constitutionality should 
be thus shifted onto the shoulders of the proponents of social and 
economic legislation was highly important; but it was even more 
important that the burden of proof could be assumed, not by the 
presentation of evidence as to actual social and economic conditions, 
but rather by the citing of precedents and the matching of legal 
arguments. The idea that the validity of a police regulation might 
really depend upon whether certain social or economic needs did or 
did not exist was quite abhorrent to the judicial mind. Thus, in 
the Ives case the New York Court of Appeals ruled out the evi-
dence presented to show that an employer's liability act was a legiti-
mate exercise of the police power.43 It said: 
"The report of the Commission is based upon a most 
voluminous array of statistical tables, extracts from the 
works of philosophical writers and tl:ie industrial laws of 
many countries, all of which are designed to show that our 
own system of dealing with industrial accidents is econom-
ically, morally and legally unsound. Under our form of 
government, however, courts must regard all economic, 
philosophical and moral theories, attractive and desirable 
though they may be, as subordinate to the primary question 
whether they can be molded into statutes without infringing 
upon the letter or spirit of our written constitutions. * * * In 
a government like ours theories of public good or neces-
sity are often so plausible or sound as to command popular 
approval, but the courts are not permitted to forget that law 
is the only chart by which the ship of state is to be guided." 
In fact, in their mechanical and legalistic construction of the 
Fourteenth Amendment so little cognizance did the courts take of 
43 Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, 287, 295 (19n). 
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the realities of modern life that we find a substantial group of cases 
in which protective labor laws are held invalid as imposing burden-
some and arbitrary restrictions upon the very laborers themselves.44 
These opinions breathe forth judicial tenderness and concern for 
the unfortunate workingman, and with hearty enthusiasm the courts 
proceeded to rescue him from an attempted legislative oppression 
which, by subjecting him to the legal requirements of reasonable 
hours and conditions of labor, infringed thus brutally upon his 
sacred right of free contract. 
It is not difficult to show that methods just described, by which 
the courts of this period applied the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to social and economic qu_estions, carried in their wake 
a whole brood of evils. In the first place, the reasonable and neces-
sary legislative adjustment of pressing problems was unduly post-
poned by a series of reactionary decisions wholly out of keeping 
with the spirit of modem times. American states found themselves, 
temporarily at least, without power to correct social and economic 
ills which other self-respecting nations had long since ceased to 
tolerate. This in itself was unfortunate. Furthermore, these results 
led to a popular criticism and distrust of the courts which has been 
even more unfortunate. No one will deny that much of this crit-
icism was ill-advised and that the layman frequently knew very 
little about the actual merits of the laws in question or the consti-
tutional issues involved. What the layman did grasp was this : 
that the courts by the application of vague principles and abstract 
legal concepts managed to defeat the efforts of the legislature to 
correct social and economic evils which needed correction. He 
refused to be swindled by the very obvious fiction that the courts 
44 In re Jacobs, g8 N. Y. 98 (1885); Ritchie v. People, 115 Ill. g8 (1895); 
Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431 (1886) ; In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415 
(1899); People v. Williams, 189 N. Y. 131 (1907). The Supreme Court, 
however, has not taken very kindly to the idea that employers may plead 
the wrongs of their employees as well ;is their own in attacking labor legis-
lation. In Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 397 (1898), the court said that 
such an argument "would certainly come with better grace and greater 
cogency from the latter class." In a later decision the court declared bluntly, 
"The -contention may be limited at the outset to the rights of the company. 
It cannot complain for its employees. * * *'' Erie R Co. v. Williams, 233 
u. s. 685, 697 (1914). 
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were "finding" the law in these cases instead of "making" it ;4~ 
and he soon lifted his voice in protest and -came finally to demand 
such drastic measures as the recall of judges or decisions, or even 
the total abolition of the power of judicial review. The courts 
found themselves in the thick of social, economic, and political con-
troversies, the objects of popular suspicion and hostility. The very 
principle of an independent judiciary came to be questioned.46 The 
ugly results of this loss of popular -confidence in the courts are not 
to be minimized by arguing that it was partially or even wholly 
undeserved. In an oft-quoted sentence Lord Herschell once declared 
that "Important as it was that the people should get justice, it was 
even more important that they should be made to see and feel that 
they were getting it" ;47 and for practical purposes it is almost as 
45 "While the lawyer believes that the principles of law are absolute, 
eternal, and of universal validity, and that law is found, not made, the people 
believe no less firmly that it may be made and that they have the power to 
make it." Pound, Courts and Legislation, 7 AMER.. PoL. Scr. Rsv. 36!, 375. 
46 It may not be irrelevant to suggest that the popular theory that judges 
directly responsible to the people through direct election will be more liberal 
in matters of constitutional construction does not seem to be borne out by 
the facts. Dean J. P. Hall has put this very clearly: "No elective courts 
exceed in liberality toward the legislature the United States Supreme Court 
or those of Massachusetts and New: Jersey, and only a very few equal them. 
Appointive courts have rarely construed constitutions as narrowly as have 
the elected courts of Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Washington, and West Vir-
ginia upon numerous occasions, and sometimes those of New York, Cali-
fornia, and Colorado. In fact, so far as I can determine from a somewhat 
careful survey of the matter, the circumstance that judges have been elected 
or that they have been appointed cannot be shown to have had any appre-
ciable direct bearing upon their decision of questions of constitutional policy. 
A judge of first-class ability is decidedly more likely to accord a rational 
freedom of choice to the legislature upon controverted points than is a 
judge of less ability, because, while all judges, from the very nature of their 
function, are likely to have a predominantly conservative cast of mind, that 
of the able judge is an intellectual conservatism, while that of his inferior 
has become instinctive, and what is novel naturally appears dangerous. The 
former is therefore more open to conviction, and as the appointive judges 
are, on the whole, somewhat superior in ability to the elected ones, they are 
therefore somewhat more liberal. This influence, however, is wholly indi-
rect." The Selection, Tenure, and Retirement of Judges, Bulletin X of the 
American Judicature Society. 
47 Atlay, Victorian Chancellors, II, 46o, quoted by Pound, Mechanical 
Jurisprudence, 8 CoLUM. L. Ri>v. 605. 
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important today that the people should actually respect and trust 
the courts as that the courts should deserve that respect and trust. 
And finally, the somewhat arrogant attitude of the courts during 
this period resulted in a falling off of a wholesome sense of respon-
sibility upon the part of our legislative bodies. The lmowledge 
that the supreme court of the state would interpose a judicial bar-
rier to the actual enforcement of legislation in questionable cases 
led many a legislature to build up its political fences by enacting 
legislation which was unconstitutional, and which was known by 
those who enacted it to be unconstitutional. The legislature reaped 
the credit of being progressive and responsive to the people's will; 
the court fell heir to the unpopularity resulting from declaring the 
legislation void. It will be a long and painful process to build up 
again the sturdy sense on the part of legislators that they must 
assume responsibility for the constitutionality of the laws they pass. 
This second period or phase in the development of the social 
and economic interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment may be 
characterized then as one in which the courts ruthlessly overrode 
the determinations of the legislature that social and economic con-
ditions justified and demanded legislative regulation; and in so 
doing they relied almost exclusively upon abstract legal concepts 
and ruled out as irrelevant any consideration of social and economic 
facts. 
III. REALISTIC INTERP1$TATIONI, OF '!'HE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
-THE CouRTS AS SOCIAL AND EcoNOMIC ExP~RTs 
During the period just discussed we ·find the courts applying to 
the construction of the Fourteenth Amendment what Dean Pound 
has called "a jurisprudence of conceptions,"48 under which social 
and economic questions were to be solved in accordance with abstract 
legal principles. In the period which began roughly about a dozen 
years ago this reliance upon abstractions came gradually to be 
replaced by reliance upon evidence as to actual economic and social 
needs. In other words, to borrow Professor Frankfurter's phrase, 
48 Courts and Legislation, 7 A!M$. Por,. Scr. R.Ev. 361 ; Mechanical Juris-
prudence, supra. 
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the courts began to inject "realism:' into our constitutional law,49 
and began to act upon the idea that the question whether legislative 
control of social and economic conditions was forbidden by the 
Fourteenth Amendment might depend upon how acute was the 
actual need for such control. And this question, of course, was 
largely one of fact, and not of abstract legal theory. In short, the 
courts came to recognize that their function in passing upon such 
questions obliged them to assume the role of social and economic 
experts. 
There is not space to discuss in detail why this change of front 
took place. But perhaps the most potent cause was the influence 
of a little group of people who combined accurate legal knowledge 
with an insight into modern social conditions and who conceived 
the idea of presenting to the court the actual evidence to prove 
that legislative regulation of social and economic conditions was 
vitally necessary and for that reason constitutionally legitimate.50 
The names most conspicuous in this group are those of Mr. Bran-
deis,51 Miss Josephine Goldmark,52 and Professor Frankfurter.53 
When the case of Muller v. Oregon54 came before the Supreme . 
Court in 1908, Mr. Brandeis and Miss Goldmark filed their famous 
brief in support of the Oregon Ten Hour Law for women, setting 
forth at great length the physiological and social reasons why women 
needed protection from over-long hours of labor.55 No intelligent 
group of men could shut out from their minds the telling force of 
49 Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29 HARV. L. Rev. 
353. 
50 There was certainly little in the briefs of counsel in the earlier cases 
to inspire the courts to take a liberal view of questions of constitutionality 
in close cases. As Mr. Brandeis expressed it, it was a case of "the blind 
leading the blind." Living Law, 10 ILL. L. Rev. 46!, 470. 
0 1 Mr. Brandeis' services in these cases were given without compensa-
tion. He continued actively in this work until his appointment to the Supreme 
Court in 1916. 
52 Publication Secretary of the National Consumers' League. 
53 Professor of Law 
1
in Harvard University. He took up this work 
when Mr. Brandeis laid it down. 
54 208 u. s. 412 ( 1!)08). 
55 This brief forms Part II of Miss Goldmark's book, Fatigue and 
Efficiency. 
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this presentation of facts. The Supreme Court succumbed to it, 
and in the course of its opinion upholding the statute it said: 
"The legislation and opinions referred to in the margin 
may not be, technically speaking, authorities, and in them 
is little or no discussion of the constitutional question pre-
sented to us for determination, yet they are significant of a 
widespread belief that woman's physical structure and the 
functions she performs in consequence thereof justify spe-
cial legislation· restricting or qualifying the conditions under 
which she should be permitted to toil. Constitutional ques-
tions, it is true, are not settled by even a consensus of pres-
ent public opinion, for it is the peculiar value of a written 
constitution that it places in unchanging form limitations 
upon legislative action, and thus gives a permanence and 
stability to popular government which otherwise would be 
lacking. At the same time, when a question of fact is debated 
and debatable, and the extent to which a special constitu-
tional limitation goes is affected by the truth in respect to 
that fact, a widespread and long-continued belief concerning 
it is worthy of consideration. We take judicial cognizance 
of all matters of general knowledge."56 
The real importance of this decision was not that a desirable 
piece of protective labor legislation was upheld, but that in uphold-
ing it the court pretty plainly served notice that it approved the 
novel technique with which the case had been argued.1>7 The Muller 
case marks the beginning of a line of cases in which briefs of this 
new kind were filed and in which social legislation was sustained 
because the courts showed themselves willing to weigh the social 
and economic facts which those briefs so clearly set forth. 58 The 
New York Court of Appeals took its place among the converts to 
50 Italics are the writer's. See also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. 
S. II (1905). 
s1 Frankfurter, op. cit., 29 HARV. L. Rev. 365. See Greeley, Changing 
Attitude of the Courts Toward Social Legislation, 5 ILL. L. R~v. 222. 
58 Ritchie v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509 (1910); Hawley v. Walker, 232 U. S. 
718 (1914); Miller v. W~lson, 236 U. S. 373 (1915); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 
236 U. S. 385 (1915); Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Ore. 519 (1914); same, 243 U. 
S. 629 (1917); People v. Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395 (1915). 
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the philosophy of "realism" in the interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and with commendable frankness reversed its earlier 
decision that the legislative prohibition of women's night work was 
a violation of due process of law."9 
"There is no reason," said Judge Hiscock, "why we should be 
reluctant to give effect to new and additional knowledge upon such 
a subject as this, even if it did lead us to take a different view of 
such a vastly important question as that of public health or disease 
than formerly prevailed. Particularly do I feel that we should 
give serious consideration and great weight to the fact that the 
present legislation is based upon and sustained by an investigation 
by the legislaturn deliberately and carefully made through an agency 
of its own creation, the present factory investigating commission." 
The supreme court of Illinois experienced a similar change of 
heart, and for similar reasons, in respect to a ten-hour law for 
women.60 
While this change of attitude upon the part of the courts was 
not sudden nor universal, it came by degrees to be fairly repre-
sentative of the modern judicial position: It involved two things. 
It involved, first, a square recognition by the courts that the con-
stitutionality of social and economic legislation depended in the 
last analysis upon the actual existence or non-existence of social or 
economic conditions justifying such legislation. In other words, 
the old mechanical "jurisprudence of concepts" gave way_ to what 
Dean Pound has called a "sociological jurisprudence."61 In the 
second place, it resulted in throwing the burden of proof back onto 
the shoulders of those who attacked the constitutionality of these 
laws in most of the cases where any positive justification based on 
facts was presented to the courts. Thus, in the case of State v. 
Bunt-ing, in which the Oregon Ten Hour Law was sustained, we 
find the Oregon supreme court, after commenting upon the social 
and economic data contained in Professor Frankfurter's and Miss 
59 People v. Schweinler Press, 214 N Y: 395, 412 (1915). 
eo Ritchie v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509 (1910). 
a1The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GruitN BAG, 6o7; The 
Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. RF.v. 591, and 
25 HARV. L. RF.v. 140, 489. 
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Goldmark' s elaborate brief, declaring :62 "In order to warrant 
declaring the act violative of the fundamental law, it should be 
shown that in the light of the world's experience and common 
knowledge the act under consideration is palpably and beyond rea-
sonable doubt one that will not tend to protect or conserve the 
public peace, health, or welfare in its enforcement." And this 
statement accurately reflects the view taken in numerous decisions 
handed down during the period under discussion.63 · 
It seems to the writer that this third phase of the judicial attitude . 
respecting the construction of the Fourteenth Amendment may be 
summarized thus : The courts did not cease to be the active arbiters 
of the validity of social and economic legislation, but they did adopt 
the policy of deciding the question of that validity upon the basis 
of social and economic facts. Legislative determinations still 
received somewhat meager respect of their own weight, but when-
ever any substantial factual basis for the legislation could be found 
either in evidence actually presented or in a consensus of public 
opinion shared by the court the burden of proof was placed squarely 
upon the shoulders of those who attacked the statute. 
IV. Tm~ PRESENT MovEMENT TowARD JumcIAr, SEr.F-DENIAr,-
SocIAr, AND EcoNOMIC QuESTION LEFT FOR LEGISI,ATIVE 
DETERMINATION 
An examination of the decisions of the courts, especially of the 
Supreme Court of the United States during the last few years, 
shows the growth of an even more liberal attitude toward social 
and economic legislation than that just discussed. There is danger 
of over-emphasizing the extent of this change. Every now and 
then there occurs a recrudescence of the old dogmatic legalism which 
raises the question whether this new judicial attitude may not, 
after all, be merely the product of an optimistic imagination.64 We 
62 71 Ore. 259, 272 (1914). 
oa "The burden is on him who attacks the legislation, and it is not sus-
tained by declaring· a liberty of contract. It can only be sustained by dem-
onstrating that it conflicts with some constitutional restraint, or that the 
public welfare is not subserved by the legislation." Erie R. Co. v. Williams, 
233 u. s. 685 (1g14). 
04 See the opinion of Chief Justice Taft in the recent case of Truax v. 
Corrigan, Adv. Opin., Oct. Term, 1921, 132. 
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may, however, examine its essential nature and what evidence there 
is of its reality. 
Many of the recent cases seem to reflect what may be called an 
attitude of judicial self-denial or laissez faire, a willingness on the 
part of the courts to regard the legislative determination that social 
and economic conditions demand statutory regulation as a conclu-
sive deteimination with which the courts will interfere only in 
cases of the most obvious and palpable abuse of discretion. This 
sounds, of course, very much like' the old orthodox doctrine that 
l~ws are presumed to be valid until proved beyond reasonable doubt 
to be otherwise. But closer scrutiny will reveal substantial prac-
tical, if not theoretical, differences. The true significance of this 
new judicial attitude may best be made by showing its relation to 
its predecessors. It was a great gain to have the courts recognize 
that the validity of social and economic legislation depended primarily 
upon questions of social and economic fact. But this attitude of 
realism merely changed the standards in accordance with which 
the courts decided those questions of legislative validity. Instead 
of testing social and economic legislation by abstract, legalistic 
standards, they tested it by what knowledge they had of social and 
economic· facts. They welcomed the presentation of those facts 
and treated any evidence regarding them with great respect. But 
it was the court itself, assuming the role of social and economic 
experts, which decided whether the facts existed and whether the 
legislative exercise of the police power was more burdensome or 
restrictive than the actual conditions warranted. 
Now the new attitude which the courts show some signs of adopt-
ing differs from this position in this respect: The courts are coming 
to recognize that the question whether social and economic condi-
tions warrant certain kinds of social legislation is not a question of 
law, as was at first assumed; nor a question of pure fact, as was 
later assumed, but a question of opinion. It is a question which 
cannot be answered dogmatically yes or no ; it is a question upon 
_which honest and sensible people will inevitably differ. This ques-
tion of opinion regarding the existence of social and economic 
conditions or the actual necessity for remedial measures is not the 
business of the courts to settle; that decision is for the legislature. 
And unless it can be shown by a preponderance of evidence that 
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the opinion of the legislature as to the need for social or economic 
legislation is one which no reasonable and honest person could 
form, that legislative determination is binding and conclusive upon 
the courts. In other words, the question before the court is very 
like the question presented to the judge who is asked to set aside 
the verdict of a jury as being contrary to the weight of evidence; 
that question is not, does the judge agree with the jury's verdict, 
but is the verdict so palpably wrong that reasonable men could not 
have reached it ?65 And so the question here is not, does the court 
agree that the social and economic legislation is warranted by the 
conditions, but could reasonable men have concluded that it was? 
The proper sphere of legislative regulation of social and economic 
conditions ceases to be defined in accordance with judicial tests of 
reasonableness and becomes, to use the words of Professor Vance, 
"substantially commensurate with the considered legislative policy 
of the state."66 
It would be a great mistake to assume that this change in atti-
tude on the part of courts has been of sudden origin, although the 
currency which it has attained is in the main a fairly recent devel-
opment. Tra~es of it are to be found, however, in judicial opinions 
written thirty years ago. Perhaps its chlef exponent is Mr. Justice 
Holmes ; and it has formed one of the chief planks in his philos-
ophy of constitutional construction ever since he first held judicial 
office.67 Little by little views first voiced by him du dissenting opin-
65 Thayer, Law and Fact in Jury Trials, 4 HARV. L. Riw. 167, 168; CASES 
ON CoNSTITUTIONAI. LAW, I, 672; LEGAL EssAYS, 20-24 
66 Coal Mining Affected with a Public Interest, 31 YAI.S L. JouR. 75. 
07 In 18g1 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts invalidated a law for-
bidding employers to impose fines on employees for defective work, on the 
ground that it violated the clause of the Massachusetts Constitution securing 
to all the right of "acquiring, possessing and protecting property." Mr. 
Justice Holmes dissented in the following language: "It might be urged, 
perhaps, that the power to make reasonable laws impliedly prohibits the 
making of unreasonable ones, and that this law is unnecessary. If I assume 
that this construction of the Constitution is correct, and that, speaking as a 
political economist, I should agree in condemning tlie law, still I should not 
be willing or think myself authorized to overturn legislation on that ground, 
unless I thought that an honest difference of opinion was impossible or 
pretty nearly so. * * * I suppose that this act was passed because the opera-
tives, or some of them, thought that they were often cheated out of part 
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ions have earned wider acceptance and are today being applied and 
extended in a way which three decades ago it would have seemed 
rash to predict. Gs 
There is space to mention only a few of the more interesting 
cases in which this new attitude of the courts is exemplified or 
suggested. We find in the Supreme Court, for example, a growing 
tendency to treat as conclusive the legislative determination that 
police regulations are warranted by existing social conditions, espe-
cially if the state courts have upheld the law. In the case of Noble 
State Bank v. Haskell, in which the Supreme Court sustained the 
Oklahoma law establishing the guarantee of bank deposits, Mr. 
Justice Holmes, speaking for the court, said :69 
"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends 
to all the great public needs. * * * It may be put forth in aid of 
what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality o:r 
strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately 
necessary to the public welfare. * * * If, then, th~ legislature of the 
state thinks that the public welfare requires the measure under con-
sideration, analogy and principle are in favor of the power to enact 
it. * * * In short, when the Oklahoma legislature declares by impli-
cation that free banking is a public danger, and. that :incorporation, 
of their wages under a false pretense that the work done by them was imper-
fect, and persuaded the legislature that their view was true. If their view 
was true, I cannot doubt that the legislature had the right to deprive the 
employers of an honest tool which they were using for a dishonest purpose, 
and I cannot pronounce the legislation void, as based on a false assumption, 
since I know nothing about the matter one way or another." Common-
wealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 124 (1891). See Frankfurter, The Consti-
tutional Opinions of Justice Holmes, 29 HARV. L. REv. 683; Dobyns, Justice 
Holmes and the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 !1,1,. L. R.!,!v. 71. 
Gs He still 1inds himself dissenting, however, as in the case of Truax v. 
Corrigan, supra, in which he said : "The dangers of a delusive exactness in 
the application of the Fourteenth Amendment have been adverted to before 
now. * * * Delusive exactness is a source of fallacy throughout the law. * * * 
I must add one general consideration. There is nothing that I more depre-
cate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute com-
pulsion of its words to prevent the making of social experiments that an 
important part of the community desires, in the insulated chambers afforded 
by the several states, even though the experiments may see1't futile or even 
noxious to me and to those whose judgment I most respect'' (page 158). 
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inspection and the above described cooperation are necessary safe-
guards, this court certainly cannot say that it is wrong." 
In 1915 an Illinois statute forbidding the sale of food preserva-
tives containing boric acid was held -by the Supreme Court not to 
violate the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.70 "The con-
tention of the plaintiff in error,'' said Mr. Justice Hughes, "could 
be granted only if it appeared that by a consensus of opinion the 
preservative was unquestionably harmless with respect to its con-
templated uses; that is, that dt indubitably must be classed as a 
wholesome article of commerce so innocuous in its designed use 
and so unrelated in any way to any possible danger to the public 
health that the enactment must be considered as a merely arbitrary 
interference with the property and liberty of the citizen. It is 
plainly not enough that the subject should be regarded as debatable. 
If it be debatable, the legiislature is entitled to its own judgment, 
and that judgment is not to be superseded by the verdict of a jury 
upon the issue which the legislature has decided." 
In sustaining a state statute prohibiting the trading-stamp busi 
ness against the charge that it was class legislation which denied 
the equal protection of the law, the court said :71 "It is established 
that a distinction in legislation is not arbitrary, if any state of facts 
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, and the existence 
of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be 
assumed." 
This position has been assumed even more strikingly in recent 
cases in which the courts have had to determine whether certain 
businesses were so affected with a public interest that legislative 
regulation could be supported, or whether taxes were being spent 
for a public purpose. The tendency to treat the legislative conclu-
sions more and more as conclusive seems apparent. In Ger'1nan 
Alliance I11surance Co. v. Lewis, decided in 1914,72 the courb 
alluded to the fact that the state legislatures throughout the country 
had come to regard the business of insurance as affected with a pub-
lic interest. "A conception so general," said the court, "cannot be 
wtlthout cause. The universal sense of a people cannot be acci-
70 Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446, 452 (1915). 
71 Rast v. Van Deman, 240 U. S. 342, 357 (1916). 
72 233 u. s. 389, 412 (1914). 
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dental; its persistence saves it from the charge of unconsidered 
impulse." And we are not surprised to find the court adopting the 
legislative view. In the recent cases sustaining the legislative con-
trol of rents and housing during the war-time emergency, we find 
this same point of view very strongly suggested. Judge Hough of 
the United States district court in New York, after commenting 
upon the doctrine of public user announced in the German Alliance 
Insurance Co. case, went on to say :73 "Since this pronouncement, 
and its legitimate and logical sequel, the 'trading stamp' case, it 
may be and has been asserted that any business is affected with a 
public interest as soon as the electorate become sufficiently inter-
ested in it to pass a regulatory statute. It is not necessary to go 
so far, but we must and do hold that the business of renting out 
living space is quite as suitable for statutory regulation, is as much 
affected with a public interest, as fire !insurance and trading stamps." 
And in discussing the alleged discriminatory features of the law 
Judge Hough declared bluntly: "If the power of classification by 
the legislature was ever judicially limited,- the effort has been aban-
doned, unless some limitation can be found !in the statement that a 
distinction is arbitrary where no 'state of facts reasonably can be 
conceived that would sustain it.' " 
When the housing legislation came before the Supreme Court, 
Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for th~ court, declared :74 "No doubt 
1 it is true that a legislative declaration of facts that are material 
only as a ground for enacting a rule of law, for instance that a 
certain use is a public one, may not be held conclusive by the courts. 
* * * But a declaration by a legislature concerning public condi-
tions that, by necessity and duty, it must know, is entitled at least to 
great respect. In this !instance Congress stated a publicly notorious 
and almost world-wide fact. That the emergency declared by the 
statute did exist must be assumed."75 
And in the case of Green v. Frazier, decided in 1920, the Supreme 
Court, in upholding the Non-partisan League program in North 
Dakota against the claim that it involved taxation for a private 
purpose, stated that "what was or was not a public use was a ques-
73 Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 269 Fed. 3o6, 3r7 (r920). 
74 Block v. Hirsh, 65 L. Ed. Sup. Ct. Rep, 53I, 532 (I92I). 
75 Writer's italics. 
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tion concerning which local authority, legislative and judicial, had 
especial means of securing information to enable them to form a 
judgment; and particularly that the judgment of the highest court 
of the state, declaring a given use to be public in its nature, would 
be accepted by this court unless clearly unfounded."76 
The writer is aware that there is nothing particularly revolution-
ary in any of these statements. Viiewed separately, their impor-
tance seems slight. Their significance is cumulative. They give 
evidence of a growing willingness on the part of the court to regard 
social and economic legislation as constitutional unless some pal-
pable and egregious defect ~n it be visible. More and more reliance ' 
is being placed upon the correctness of legislative determination: 
As contrasted with earlier decisions, these recent opinions are to 
be distinguished perhaps only by the degree of respect accorded 
the legislature. But differences of degree sometimes are substan-
tial enough to amount to ·differences of kind; and an examination 
of the cases has convinced the writer that a movement towards a 
new judicial attitude toward the social and economic interpretation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment has clearly· set in. 
It merely remains to evaluate this new attitude of the courts. 
Is it a weak-kneed abdication of a judicial authority which ought 
to be exercised? Or is it a wholesome return to a sound apprecia-
tion of the proper sphere of judicial action? This is a question 
about which men will, of course, disagree v.igorously. It seems to 
the writer, however, that the new movement is wige and salutary. 
It represents, in the first place, a wholesome readjustment of the 
relations which ought to exist and which always should have existed 
between the courts and the legislatures. By regarding the findings 
of the legislature upon questions of social and economic fact as 
conclusive in the absence of some flagrant abuse of discretion, the 
courts abandon the position of trying to settle questions of social 
and economic policy, which they are wholly unfitted to settle, and 
leave those questions, together with the responsibility for their solu-
tion, where it belongs, upon the legislatures. In the second place, 
such a readjustment as this would help immeasurably fo building 
up again that popular confidence in the courts which we have seen 
has been to some extent lost. Finally, it would greatly aid in 
76 253 u. s. 233 (1920). 
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rehabilitating the feeble sense of responsibility which legislators 
assume in respect to the constitutionality of the laws they pass. 
By the firm establishment" of such a salutary judicial tradition as 
this new attitude of the courts bids fair to establish, the writer 
believes that we would correct the only actual defects which have 
ever existed in our system of judicial review, and we would correct 
them without resorting t~ any of the more radical and questionable 
devices, such as the recall of judges or decisions, which have from 
time to time been proposed.77 
University of Minnesota. ROBERT EuGENE CUSHMAN. 
77 "When the lawyer refuses to act intelligently, unintelligent application 
of the legislative steam-roller by the layman is the alternative." Pound. 
The Spirit of the Common Law, preface xiv. 
